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Before 1979, unemployment insurance (UI) benefits were not treated
as taxable income in the United States. Several economists criticized
this policy on the ground that not taxing UI benefits while taxing earned
income allegedly encourages unemployed persons to conduct longer than
socially optimal job searches. Since 1979, however, UI benefits received
by persons in higher—income families have been subject to income tax.
This paper investigates whether the introduction of benefit taxation has
had the predicted effect of reducing unemployment duration.
The study uses data on a sample of persons that filed) for UI in 1978
or 1979 to examine whether high—income claimants collected benefits for
shorter periods after the tax change than they did before benefits became
taxable. As part of the empirical analysis, the paper develops a gnerali—
zation of the Weibull distribution and applies a limited—dependent—variable
technique for this distribution similar to the Tobit technique for the nor-
mal distribution. Despite some variation in the results from different
model specifications, the analysis presents persuasive evidence of a tax
effect on unemployment duration. The 1979 policy change is estimated to
have reduced average compensated unemployment duration among the sampled
high—income claimants by about one week.
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The University of Michigan
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1. Introduction
Before 1979, unemployment insurance (UI) benefits were not treated
as taxable income in the United States. Several economists1 criticized
this policy on the ground that not taxing unemployment benefits while
taxing earned income produces perverse economic incentives, one of which is
allegedly to encourage unemployed persons to conduct longer than socially
optimal job searches. Perhaps as a result of this critJ.cism, UI benefits
received by persons in higher—income families were subjected to income tax
in 1979. Specifically, benefits became taxable on joint tax returns
reporting at least $25,000 of adjusted gross income (counting UI benefits)
and on single returns reporting at least $20,000. In 1982, these income
thresholds were lowered respectively to $18,000 and $12,000. A recent pro-
posal within the Reagan administration to extend benefit taxation still
further was motivated by the policy's supposed work incentive effects.2
This paper presents an empirical analysis of the work incentive
effects of the 1979 policy change. It uses data on a sample of persons
that filed for UI in 1978 or 1979 to examine whether claimants collected
benefits for shorter periods after the tax change than they did before
benefits became taxable. Section 2 of the paper briefly reviews previous
theoretical and empirical work on related issues. Section 3 describes the
study's data base. Section 4 presents analyses of the data, and Section 5
summarizes and discusses the results.—2—
2. Previous Research
Theoretical analyses of UI and unemployment duration typically have
examined the duration effects of changes in weekly benefit level, not
changes in benefit taxation. But, if UI recipients do not suffer from "tax
illusion," they should respond to benefit taxation as a reduction in their
net benefit level, so that the same results apply. st of the theoretical
work has analyzed UI and unemployment duration in the framework of job
search theory. Nortensen (1970) provides a representative example of this
approach, and Lippman and McCall (1976) survey the search theory litera-
ture. Despite variations among models, several general conclusions emerge.
One is that unemployment duration of UI recipients is negatively related to
cost of unemployment and hence positively related to benefit level. By
similar reasoning, individuals that assign a large value to the leisure
component of unemployment will impute a smaller opportunity cost to
unemployment and will tend to stay unemployed longer. Another conclusion
is that expected unemployment duration depends in complicated ways on the
individual's wage offer distribution. On one hand, at a given benefit
level, a higher—wage worker faces a greater opportunity cost of
unemployment so that he might return to work more quickly. Higher—skill
workers mayhaveshorter unemployment duration also because they are
qualified for a larger proportion of job openings. On the other hand,
higher—skill workers may face wage offer distributions shaped in such a way
that they set reservation wages high enough to give them longer expected
unemployment duration.—3—
Labor supply theory, as well as job search theory, can be used to
generate similarconclusions.3 Indeed, almost any applicable economic
theory should reproduce the first conclusion ——thatpaying people more to
be unemployed tends to increase how much they are unemployed.
Drawing from the theoretical conclusions above, numerous empirical
studies have investigated the dependence of unemployment duration on UI
benefits, variables associated with leisure—income preference, and
variables associated with wage offer distributions. Disentangling UI
effects from wage effects is especially difficult because each state UI
program in the United States computes individuals'beneit levels on the
basis of their prior earnings. Researchers have adopted two strategies for
obtaining independent variation in UI benefits and wages. One approach,
exemplified by Ehrenberg and Oaxaca (1976), is to use a sample of UI
claimants from several states with different benefit formulas. The sample
then contains individuals with similar earnings histories but different UI
entitlements. As Ehrenberg and Oaxaca acknowledge, however, there remains
a possibility of simultaneity bias. It is unclear whether the observed
positive correlation between duration and benefit level arises because
states with more liberal benefits induce their claimants to stay unemployed
longer or because states whose unemployed experience longer unemployment
spells adopt more liberal benefit formulas.
The other approach, exemplified by Classen (1979), is to analyze
within—state data spanning a period when the state's benefit schedule has
been substantially changed. Using data from Pennsylvania and Arizona,—4—
Classen finds that benefit increases in both states were accompanied by
significant Increases in unemployment duration. As Welch (1977) discusses
in detail, both the Ehrenberg—Oaxaca and Classen studies, like most others,
are subject to censorship or truncation biases. More recent analyses of
British data by Lancaster (1979) and Nickell (1979) have developed more
appropriate econometric methods to treat these problems, but because
Britain has a uniform national UI program, these analyses require strong
identifying restrictions to disentangle UI effects from the effects of
wages and other characteristics.
The present study is similar in spirit to the Cl'assen study in that
it analyzes unemployment duration during a period containing a major policy
change. This study, however, applies more appropriate econometric tech-
niques and is the first to present direct evidence on the duration effects
of taxing unemployment benefits—5—
3. Data Description
This study analyzes data on several thousand persons that filed
valid UI claims in Georgia in 1978 or 1979. Because benefit taxation was
initiated in 1979, these data afford the opportunity to compare the
unemployment duration of claimants before benefits were taxed with the
duration of those that claimed benefits after the tax change. The data
were collected as part of the Continuous Wage and Benefit History (CWBH)
program, a pilot effort by the U.S. Department of Labor and state
employment security agencies to develop data banks on smples of workers
covered by the UI program.1 The CWBH files combine administrative data
from the sampled individuals' claims records with questionnaire data on
theirpersonal characteristics. The administrative information Includes
data on claimants' prior earnings, benefit entitlements, and how long they
collectedbenefits. The questionnaire information includes, among other
things, income data that enable imputation of whichclaimantshad high
enough Income to be subject to benefit taxation. (Fourteen percent of the
1979 claimants in the sample were above the relevant income thresholds.)
Only Georgia's CWBH data were used because Georgia is the only state with
extensive questionnaire data from as early as the beginning of 1978.
This study's sample includes claimants that initiated valid claims
between January and June 1978 or January and June 1979. Persons that ini-
tiated claims in July—December 1978 are excluded from the study's sample
because of the likelihood that they collected part of their benefit
entitlement in 1979, in which case that part might have been subject to—6—
incometax. The 1978 sample is therefore restricted to early—in—the—year
filers to achieve a cleaner separation between the pre—tax and post—tax
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groups.
A description of some of the features of Georgia's UI program in
1978—79 will clarify the empirical work below. A claimant's benefit
entitlement depended on his earnings in the "base period," the first four
of the last five completed calendar quarters prior to his filing the claim.
His weekly benefit amount (WBA) was set at 1/25 of hs hIghest—quarter
earnings in the base period, except that the minimum WBA was $27and the
maximum was $90. Forty—five percent of the sample claimants (and 66% of the
taxable group6) qualified for the maximum WBA. A claimant's total entitle-
ment during his "benefit year," the 52—week period following his initial
claim—filing, was the lesser of 1/4 of his base period earnings or26 times
his WBA. Consequently, about a quarter of the claimants qualified for the
maximum 26 weeks of potential benefit duration, but most were entitled to
fewer weeks.
Although Georgia's weekly benefit schedule was nominally unchanged
during the sample period, the high inflation rates of the period meantthat
the schedule changed substantially in real terms. For example, a January
1978 claimant with high—quarter earnings of $2500 received the maximum $90
WBA.A June 1979claimant with the same real prior earnings had nominal
high—quarter earnings of over $2700.He tooreceived a nominal WBA of $90,
whichby then was worth less than $80 in January 1978 dollars. Thus, com-
pared to his January 1978 twin, the June 1979 claimant experiencedwell
over a 10% reduction in real benefits. This change in thereal benefit—7—
schedule facilitates the separation of Ut's effects on unemployment dura-
tion from the effects of wage levels.
This study uses data on only those sample claimants that responded
to the CWBH questionnaire. The nonresponse rate of about 2/3 raises the
issue of nonresponse bias. By far the main cause of nonresponse was
Georgia's system of employer—filed claims, under which an employer tem-
porarily laying off part or all of its work force could submit a packet of
UI claims for all its laid—off employees.' Because the employees them-
selves did not appear at a claims office, they had no opportunity to fill
out the questionnaire. As a result, this study's sampl consists mainly of
persons permanently separated from their former employers. This exclusion
of employer—filed claims may actually be desirable.Feldstein (1978) has
argued that studies of UI's effect on unemployment duration should exclude
persons on temporary layoff to avoid confounding UI's duration effects with
its effects on frequency of temporary layoffs.—8—
4. Data Analysis
The 1979 institution of benefit taxation applied only to claimants
with family income above the thresholds described in the introduction of
this paper. The basic empirical strategy of this study is to compare the
unemployment duration of high—income claimants before and after the tax
change, using duration data on low—income claimants (for whom there was no
policy change) to adjust for 1978—79 duration trends not attributable to
the tax change. It is conceivable that benefit taxation had no work incen-
tive effect, especially since taxes were not withheld from the benefit
checks. If it did not, high—income claimants in 1979 should show no rela-
tive reduction in unemployment duration. On the other hand, claimants were
formallynotified of the tax change and may have responded to the resulting
reduction in net benefit levels by altering their job—seeking behavior.
If so, high—income claimants in 1979 should show a duration reduction not
attributable to other factors.
The duration measure used throughout the analysIsis thenumberof
weeksthat the claimant collected UI during his benefit year. It should be
understood that this is not a pure measure of duration per spell because
many claimants collect benefits In more than one spell duringthe benefit
year.8 The duration measure used therefore does not accord perfectly with
job search theory. Nevertheless, the effect of benefit taxation ontotal
weeks unemployed, rather than weeks per spell, is probably of greater poli-
cy interest. It should also be noted that numberof weeks of benefit
collection is a censored duration measure. For the 24% of the sample—9—
claimants that used up their entire benefit entitlement, weeks collected
measures only their compensated duration and not the weeks they were
unemployed after benefit exhaustion. This censorship issue is treated in
detail later in the paper.
The results from the more elaborate models presented below can be
previewed by a simple comparison of means. Among the low—income claimants
in the sample, mean compensated unemployment duration was 8.7 weeks for
both the 1978 and 1979 filers, 1mplyng no general decline in duratIon be-
tween the two years. Among the high—income claimants, however, mean dura-
tion fell from 10.8 weeks in 1978, when their benefits were not taxable, to
8.4 weeks in 1979, when their benefits were taxable. The large duration
reduction among high—income claimants suggests the possibility that the
introduction of benefit taxation did indeed affect unemployment duration.—l 0.-
Regression Analyses
This section presents the results of regression analyses relating
unemployment duration to pre— and post—tax benefit levels. These analyses
produce estimated duration effects of WBA that can be compared to the
results of earlier studies, and directly test whether claimants respond
only to pre—tax benefit levels or whether they react also to tax—induced
reductions in net benefits.9
The basic behavioral equation is posited to take the form
DURATION =f{8(l—pt)WBA+ 'X +
that is, duration is functionally dependent on the bracketed linear func-
tion, in which X Is a vector of control variables and c is a random error
term. The variable t is the tax rate on UI benefits so that t>O for high—
Income claimants in 1979 and t=O otherwise. The parameter p is a coef-
ficient of tax perception such that p=O if claimants behave as if they are
unaware of the tax and p=1 if they respond to benefit taxation fully as
they do to other benefit reductions. The function f will be assumed to be
either an identity function, so that DURATION equals the bracketed
expression, or an exponential function, so that the natural logarithm of
DURATION equals the bracketed expression.
Now let t equal a constant t for those claimants whose benefits are
taxable, and let t=O for the nontaxableclaimants.10 This dichotomous
treatment of t is admittedly a crude approximation, but it does capture the
salient aspect of variation in benefit taxation ——mostclaimants' benefits
are not taxable at all, but the high—income 1979 claimants' benefits are—11—
subject to positive (and typically high) marginal tax rates. If we also
let the dummy variable D equal 1 for taxable claimants and 0 for nontaxable
claimants, then
DURATION =f{8(1—ptD)WBA+y 'X +
=f{8(WBA)—8pt(DWBA)+y'X +c}
This last expression allows WBA and DWBA to be entered as separate
regressors in the duration equation. The coefficient of WBA, f3, measures
WBA's duration effect for claimants whose benefits are not taxable. The
estimate of this coefficient is comparable to the estimated WBA coef-
ficients in earlier studies of UI and duration. The coefficient of DWBA,
—apt, measures how much the duration effect is reduced when, because of
benefit taxation, the claimant cannot keep all of his gross benefits. If
benefit taxation has no effect, then p=O (or =O if UI benefits have no
effect at all). In this case, the coefficient of DWBA should be zero.
But if taxes do affect duration, then p>O and >O, in which case the coef-
ficient of DWBA should be negative. Moreover, the negative of the coef-
ficient of DWBA divided by the coefficient of WBA gives an implied value
of pt. Combined with extraneous information on t, an estimate of pt provides
information on the value of p. Tabulations by Daniel Feenberg from NBER's
1979 tax files suggest that the typical marginal tax rate (including the
Georgia state income tax) on benefits received by high—income claimants
might be slightly above .3. Dividing this value into the estimate of pt
yields a rough estimate of p. Alternatively, if one wishes to begin with—12—
thehypothesis that p1, the negative of the ratio of estimated
coefficients gives an estimate of t, which can be compared with the
extraneous information on t.Ifthe comparison is close, one might accept
the hypothesis p=1.
The first column of Table 1 presents the results of a regression of
compensated unemployment duration against WBA, DWBA, and a set of control
variables. The variables WBAandDWBAwereconverted to October 1980
dollars with the Atlanta Consumer Price Index. The control variables,
similar to those used in other studies of UI and duration, were chosen
because of their possible relationship with claimants' cost of unemployment
and/or distribution of employment opportunities. The variables include
potential benefit duration, high—quarter earnings (also converted to
October 1980 dollars), the ratio of base—period to high—quarter earnings
(a measure of previous employment stability), years of education, age, the
average total unemployment rate in Georgia during the claimant's benefit
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year, and dummyvariablesfor year and month of filing, sex, race, occu-
pation, marital status, expectation of recall to former employer, and
whether family income was above the 1979 threshold for benefit taxation.
Because of the importance of separating UI effects from nonlinear wage
effects,12 the high—quarter earnings variable is supplemented by a squared
term, a term interacted with the high—income dummy, and a term interacted
with the 1979 dummy. In addition, the marital and spouse—working dummies
are interacted with the female dummy. Squared terms for education and age
also were tested, but their estimated coefficients were not statistically
significant and their inclusion had almost no effect on the results.—13—
TABLE1
Estimated Parameters (and Standard Errors) from Models of
UnemploymentDuration
Explanatory Level Log WelbullGeneralized
Variables RegressionRegression Model Weibull Model
Constant —6.92 —.180 .359 .240
(4.75) (.702) (.668) (.672)
WBA .045 .0075 .0071 .0053
(.008) (.0012) (.0012) (.0014)
DWBA —.018 —.0025 —.0016 —.0003
(.007) (.0011) (.0010) (.0013)
High income —.53 —.034 —.142 —.142
(.74) (.109) (.102) (.105)
Potential benefit .42 .041 .030 .026
duration (.06) (.009) (.008) (.009)
Female .34 .082 .02 .050
(.34) (.050) (.048) (.050)
Black or Hispanic .82 .099 .125 .124
(.23) (.034) (.033) (.035)
Occupation:
Professional, tech., 1.87 .284 .250 .251
managerial (.44) (.065) (.063) (.066)
Clerical, sales .73 .123 .120 .120
(.37) (.055) (.052) (.054)
Service
Agric., fishery, 1.33 .148 .269 .267
forestry, related (1.05) (.155) (.154) (.166)
Processing —.35 .062 —.057 —.057
(.56) (.082) (.076) (.080)
Machine trades .26 .094 .039 .038
(.43) (.064) (.060) (.062)
Benchwork —.02 .085 —.0002 —.0009
(.47) (.069) (.065) (.068)
Structural work 1.10 .273 .176 .174
(.42) (.062) (.059) (.061)
Miscellaneous —.66 —.064 —.078 —.079
(.42) (.061) (.057) (.059)
High—quarter earnings —.59 —.093 —.088 —.086
(HQE, in thousands) (.27) (.040) (.036) (.037)
HQE squared .009 .0029 .0017 .0015
(.014) (.0021) (.0018) (.0019)
HQE x high income .39 .043 .050 .051
(.13) (.019) (.018) (.018)
Base—period earnings! —.73 —.138 —.118 —.118
HQE (.36) (.053) (.049) (.051)—14-.
Married —.73 —.049 —.120 —.123
(.35) (.051) (.048) (.049)
Married x female —1.09 —.230 —.155 —.153
(.77) (.113) (.106) (.107)
Spouseworking —.24 —.022 —.020 —.020
(.36) (.054) (.050) (.051)
Spouse working x 2.19 .250 .346 .344
female (.77) (.114) (.106) (.109)
Education .08 .014 .012 .012
(.05) (.007) (.007) (.007)
Age .08 .010 .014 .014
(.009) (.0014) (.0014) (.0014)
Expecting recall —.25 .108 —.037 —.038
(.24) (.035) (.033) (.035)
1979dummy 1.22 .215 .218 .217
(.44) (.064) (.061) (.061)
1979x HQE —.32 —.061 —.045 —.045
(.12) (.017) (.016) (.016)
Month of filing:
January
February —.03 —.044 .022 .022
(.41) (.060) (.058) (.061)
March —.50 —.127 —.039 —.038
(.39) (.057) (.054) (.057)
April —.62 —.128 —.063 —.063
(.38) (.056) (.053) (.055)
May —1.08 —.167 —.131 —.131
(.40) (.059) (.056) (.058)
June —.49 —.102 —.043 —.043
(.40) (.060) (.056) (.059)
Unemployment rate .62 .085 .061 .062








Log likelihood x i0 —1.733748 —1.733309
.08 .05
Number of Observations =6,610—15—
The coefficient of WBA is estimated as .045 and its difference from
zero is statistically significant at any conventional level. The estimate
implies that, on average, a $10 increase in benefit level (in October 1980
dollars) increases an untaxed claimant's compensated duration by almost
half a week, a result consistent with the findings of previous studies.
The coefficient of DWBA is estimated as —.018, and its difference from
zero also is decidedly significant. Hence, the null hypothesis of no tax
effect is rejected. If p=l, the negative of the ratio of DWBA's coef-
ficient to WBA's coefficient should yield a plausible value for t. This
ratio turns out be be .40 (with an estimated standarderror13 of .18),
reasonably close to the expected t.
Table 2 presents the coefficient estimates of main interest from
some variations on the duration regression. The first column reproduces
the WBA and DWBA coefficients from the regression described above. One
question that can be raised about that regression is whether the sizable
DWBA coefficient is due not to a tax effect, but to variation by income in
the duration impact of WBA. The regression reported in column 2 addresses
this question by including an interaction of the WBA variable with the
high—income dummy. This interaction variable turns out to have an esti-
mated coefficient close to zero, and its inclusion has virtually no effect
on the estimated WBA and DWBA coefficients or their standard errors.
Another question is how the results would be affected by the separate
inclusion of the D variable not interacted with WBA. If this variable—16—
showed a significant negative coefficient, and particularly if its inclu-
sion caused the DWBAcoefficientto disappear, one would then suspect
that the shorter unemployment duration among high—income 1979 claimants was
due not to the tax—induced reduction in their benefits, but to some other
factor. As shown in column 3, when D is entered separately, its
coefficient is positive and small in magnitude, and the estimated DWBA
coefficient stays about the same. Clearly, the high collinearity between D
and DWBA inflates the standard errors of both coeffc1ents and makes pre-
cise estimation impossible, but it is at least somewhat reassuring that the
magnitude of the DWBA coefficient estimate does not decline and that the D
variable does not separately explain the duration reduction for the taxable
claimants.
TABLE 2
Estimated Coefficients (and Standard Errors) of Key
Variables in Duration Regressions
WBA .045 .046 .045
(.008) (.009) (.008)
DWBA —.018 —.018 —.020
(.007) (.007) (.023)




Theregression reported in the second column of Table 1 duplicates
the one in column 1 except that the new dependent variable is
log (compensated duration + 1). Duration is incremented by1 to avoid
taking the logarithm of zero. This is necessary because many sample mem-
bers initiated valid claims but collected no benefits, presumably because
they returned to work before completing a full week ofunemployment.1
While adding 1 to weeks of compensated duration is motivated primarily by
computational convenience, it also makes sense as a procedure for rounding
fractional weeks of unemployment up to the next integer.
The coefficients of the logarithmic regressions can be interpreted
as the approximate proportional changes in duration associatedwith unit
changes in the regressors. The WBA coefficient is estimated as.0075.
Evaluated at the sample mean duration of 10 weeks (after adding 1 to com-
pensated duration), this estimate implies that a $10 increase inWBA is
associated with a duration increase of about three—quarters of a week,
toward the upper end of the range from previous studies. The estimated
DWBA coefficient of —.0025 is significantly different from zero at most
conventional levels, rejecting the hypothesis of no tax effect. If p=1,
the ratio of the coefficient estimates implies a very plausible tax rate t
of .33 (with standard error .16).
In summary, the results of the duration regressions vary somewhat
with choices of functional form and explanatory variables. But the results
consistently reject the hypothesis of no tax effect, and the relative—18—
magnitudes of the WBAandDWBAcoefficientsare roughly consistent with
the assumption that claimants respond to benefit taxation much as theydo
to other benefit reductions.—19—
Treatment of the Censorship Problem
Asmentioned before, weeks of regular benefit collection is a cen-
sored measure of unemployment duration for any claimant that continued to
be unemployed after exhausting his benefit entitlement. As Welch (1977)
has pointed out, this problem is likely to cause regression results to
understate the duration impact of benefit changes. Classen (1979) and
Newton and Rosen (1979) have used Tobit analysis to deal with the cen-
sorship problem, but the Tobit technique assumes that unemployment duration
is normally distributed. This assumption could hardly be further from the
truth. A frequency plot of compensated duration for a homogeneous sub-
sample of the Georgia claimants shows not a bell—shaped curve, but a modal
frequency for zero weeks and progressively smaller frequencies for longer
duration (until a spike appears at the censorship point).
At first glance, the frequency plot suggests that the duration data
might be fitted by an exponential distribution. But the exponential
distribution implies that a claimant's reemployment probability remains
constant over the course of his unemployment spell, and there are several
reasons to question this restriction. On one hand, numerous variants of
the job search model ——incorporatingfinite lifetime, risk aversion, capi-
tal constraints, or finite potential benefit duration ——predictdeclining
reservation wages and hence rising reemployment probabilities during an
unemployment spell. On the other hand, potential employers may perceive
lengthy unemployment as a signal of low productivity, and in some cases
workers' skills may actually atrophy with prolonged unemployment. The
resulting deterioration in the individual's employment opportunities could—20—
conceivablycause his probability of reemployment to decline with
unemployment duration.
To allow for duration dependence in reemployment probabilities,
Lancaster (1979) has proposed the use of the Weibull distribution, of which
the exponential is a special case. A convenient formulation of the Weibull
distribution implies a reemployment hazard (or exit—from—unemployment rate)
function of the form
h(y)=ay-exp(— 'X) (1)
where y is the number of weeks already unemployed, X is1 a vector of
variables (including WBA and DWBA) that may affect duration,is a para-
meter greater than zero, andis a vector of parameters associated with X.
The elasticity of this hazard ratewithrespect to y is c—1. If =1, the
Welbulldegenerates tothe special case of the exponential. If c>l, the
reemploymenthazard rises withduration; if a<1,itdeclines.15
Theprobability density function of completed duration Y is then
f(Y) =aYCexp{-8 'X -exp(-8'X)} (2)
and expected duration is
E(Y)=exp(8'X/a)r{(c* +
where r is the gamma function.16 If we differentiate the natural logarithm
of expected duration with respect to xh, the h—th variable in X, we obtain
3 log E(Y)/3xh = (3)—21—
Thus, estimates ofand a can be used to estimate the proportional changes
in expected duration associated with unit changes in explanatory variables.
The Georgia data do not permit complete observation of duration.
Instead, we observe
=Yif Y < P + 1
=P+ 1 if Y) P + 1
where *iscompensated duration plus 1, as in the logarithmic regression,
and P is potential benefit duration. To deal with this "right censorship,"
we now derive a maximum likelihood estimation technique for the Weibull
distribution analagous to the Tobit technique for the normal distribution.
If the i—th claimant's compensated duration —1is less than his
potential benefit duration P, his contribution to the likelihood function







Hence,the likelihood function for the full sample is
L =iiaY exp{- exp(-'X)}it exp{—rexp(—'X)}
1 2
where II denotes a product taken over the claimants that did not exhaust
1—22—








where xi1 is the number of "nonexhaustees,"denotes a sum over non—
1
exhaustees, andis a sum over exhaustees.
2
The parameters a andcan be estimated by maximizing the log like-
lihood function with respect to the parameters. This procedurewas applied
to the Georgia data with the same explanatoryvariables that were used in
theTable 1 regressions.18
The results are reported in the third column of Table1. The esti-
mated value of .8 for the parameter a is significantlyless than 1 and
implies that the reemployment hazard declineswith duration. As Heckman
and Borjas (1980) and Lancaster (1979) have observed, however,it is
unclear how to interpret this finding. while it maybe due to true dura-
tion dependence, it may also be explained byunobserved heterogeneity in
the sample. If some claimants, because of unobserved factors,have lower
reemployment probabilities than other seeminglyIdentifical claimants, they
will tend to stay unemployed longer. Then, even ifindividuals'
reemployment hazards are constant over time,the data will display spurious
duration dependence ——amongseemingly identical claimants, those
unemployed longer will have lower reemployment probabilities.—23—
The estimated WBA coefficient of .0071 is significantly different
from zero at any conventional level. As was shown in equation (3), the
coefficient estimate must be divided by the estimate of a to obtain the
proportional change in expected duration associated with a unit change in
untaxed WBA. The result implies a proportional change of .0089.
The estimated DWBA coefficient of —.0016 also is significantly dif-
ferent from zero at the .10 level, but not quite at the .05 level.
Dividing the coefficient by the estimate of ci indicates that the propor-
tional duration effect of a dollar change in WBA is reduced by .0019 if
benefits are taxed. If p=1, the ratio of the DWBA and WBA coefficients
implies a tax rate of .22 (with standard error .15), somewhat (but in-
significantly) less than the expected rate. Dividing the ratio by an
assumed tofslightly above .3 would give a point estimate of about .7
for p.
While the Weibull framework provides a convenient and easily
interpreted model that allows for duration dependence, it is still somewhat
restrictive. In particular, as a referee has noted, equation (1) implies
that the proportional effects of benefit variables on the hazard rate stay
constant throughout an unemployment spell. To allow for the possibility
that these effects diminish as an individual draws closer to exhausting his




—logy}{i1(WBA) +y2(DWBA)]} for y(P+l
=ayalexp(_iX)for y)P+1
If1120, this hazard function specializes to the Weibull case.Other-
wise, the effects of benefit variables on reemployment probability vary
with the time remaining until benefit exhaustion.
As shown in the appendix, this generalization of the Weibull distri-
butionleads to the new log likelihood function
log L = {loga+ (a + G —1)log Y
—
Gilog + 1) —
— [a/(a+ G1)I (P1+1)i exp( 'X1)}
—[a/(a+G)](P+ 1)a exp(— 'X1)
where G =1(WBA)+ i2(DWBA). The results of maximizing this function
withrespect to its parameters are shown in the last columnof Table 1. A
likelihood ratio test of the Weibull model versus the generalized Weibull
model rejects the Weibull model at the .05 level.
Unfortunately, the additional complexity of the generalized model
makes it more difficult to interpret. Nevertheless, three important obser-
vations can be made. First, as expected, the estimates of the andy
coefficients for WBAandDWBAimplythat net benefit level has a negative—25—
effect on reemployment probability and that the magnitude of this effect
declines as benefits are used up. Second, to test the hypothesis of no tax
effect, the generalized model was reestirnated with 12 and thecoefficient
for DWBAconstrainedto equal zero. The resulting log likelihood value
was —1.733641 x io,sothat a likelihood ratio test rejects the hypothe-
sis of no tax effect at the .05 level.
Third, to clarify the magnitude of the estimated tax effect, a
policy simulation was conducted. As shown in the appendix, the expected
value of compensated unemployment duration in the generalized model is
E(Y*)={ [ (a+G)/a](P+l)Gexp($ 'x)} 1/(G) r a
{a/(a+G)] (P+l) exp(— 'X)
+ exp{—{ct/(a+G)J (P+1)aexp(_ 'X)} (P+1) (4)
where the subscripted Ftermis an incomplete gammafunction.19 This
expectation can be estimated for each member of the sample by substituting
in his observed X values, his potential benefit duration P, and the maximum
likelihood estimates of the parameters a, 13, and 1.
The effect of benefit taxation on compensated duration can be esti-
mated by first computing the sample mean of the estimates of E(Y*) among
the high—income 1979 claimants. Then, to estimate what their average dura-
tion would have been in the absence of benefit taxation, we set DWBA=0 and
recompute the estimates of E(Y*). A comparison of the sample meanswith
and without benefit taxation yields an estimate of the policy's mean
impact.—26—
The mean of the estimates of E(Y*) with benefits taxed is 9.6 weeks,
reasonably close to 1 plus the mean compensated duration of 8.4 weeks
actually observed for the high—income 1979 claimants. The mean of the
estimates of E(Y*) without benefits taxed is 10.8 weeks. The implied
average effect of benefit taxation on the high—income1979 claimants is
therefore a 1.2 week reduction in their compensatedduration.20—27—
5. Summary and Discussion
This paper has presented a series of analyses of the effect of
taxing unemployment benefits on unemployment duration. Despite some
variation in the results from different model specifications, the analyses
have repeatedly found that unemployment benefit levels do affect
unemployment duration, and have produced persuasive evidence that the
duration impact of taxing benefits is similar to that of other benefit
reductions. The 1979 imposition of benefit taxation is estimated to have
reduced average compensated unemployment duration amon the sampled
high—income claimants by about one week.
This finding implies that the budgetary effects of benefit taxation
extend beyond the direct revenue increases from taxes collected on benefit
income. One additional effect is the tax revenue collected from the
increased earnings of claimants who return to work more quickly when their
benefits are taxed. If we simplify by letting t be a constant tax rate and
let W be the claimant's weekly wage when working, DUR0 be his unemployment
duration without benefit taxation, and tDUR be his duration change due to





The first term in brackets is the benefit income the claimant would have
collected in the absence of benefit taxation. The second term is his addi-
tional gross income induced by benefit taxation.—28--
This expression makes clear that, if the budgetary impact of some
proposed benefit taxation is to be forecasted, a projection based only on
the affected claimants' benefit income before the tax would underestimate
the total impact by overlooking the second term. For example, the results
f.or the Georgia sample imply that, among the 1979 high—income claimants,
DU1WBA averaged $1030 while the second term,
—DUR(W—WBA),averaged
$337 21 Therefore, a projection that neglected the work incentive effect
of benefit taxation might have underestimated the increase in tax revenue
by as much as about 25%. All of the above analysis, however, assumesthat
the claimant's weekly wage W remains constant. If the claimants faced with
benefit taxation return to work more quickly by accepting lower—wage jobs,
the second term in the equation for tT Is correspondingly reduced. The
empirical evidence on whether UI—induced duration changes areindeed accom-
panied by wage—rate changes isambiguous.22
.Axtother budgetary implication of benefit taxation's work incentive
effect is the impact on UI program costs. These costs are reduced by
D1JRWBA, the tax—induced reduction in gross benefit income. The Georgia
results imply that, for the 1979 high—income claimants, this reduction in
benefit payments averaged $115, an 11% reduction from the $1030 average bene-
fit income they would have collected in the absence of benefit taxation.
The work incentive effects of benefit taxation, along with the
attendant budgetary effects, do not by themselves prove that benefit taxa-
tion is good policy. Like any cutback in an income transfer program, a
tax—induced reduction in net unemployment compensation may undercut the
income maintenance objectives of the program. If benefit taxation—29—
is not accompanied by an increase in pre—tax benefit levels, work incen-
tives may be improved, but the unemployment insurance program also will be
less effective in its purpose of insuring job losers against income reduc—
tions.—30—
Appendix: Properties of the Generalized Weibull Distribution
The hazard function for the generalized Weibull distribution is
h(y) =ay"1exp{—6'X —(logB —logy)c}foryB
=czy"4exp{-8'X} for y B
where B =P+ 1 and C =i1(WBA)+y2(DWBA). The relation between the




F(Y) =1—exp{—[a/(a+C)]Bexp(—.'X)} for Y< B
=1—exp{—[—(G/(c-FC))B] exp(—8'X)}for Y )B
Then
F(B)=1—exp{—[a/(c*+G)]Ba exp(— 'X)}
Differentiation of F(Y) with respect to Y gives the probability density
function
f(Y)= lBGexp{ 'X—[a/(a+G)] Bexp(- 'X)}for Y B
=ctt1exp{-'x— [?(G/(cz.+C))Ba]exp(-'X)}for Y > B—31—
Now consider the censored variable
y*y if Y B
=B if Y> B
The likelihood function for a sample of Y is
L =IIf(Y) ii [i —F(Y)]
1 2
where ii denotes a product taken over observations with <Band ii
1 2
denotes a product taken over observations with Y =B1.Dropping
subscripts and substituting in the appropriatedistribu'tion and density
functions,




Then the log likelihood function is







Theexpected value of the uncensored variable Y is
B
E(Y) = Yf(Y)dY + 'B f(Y) dY
Denoting the first integral by N and the second by N,
M=a?BG exp{
— Bexp('X)}dY




#exp(—8 'X) z'11)]—1 e_ZdZ
=([(ct+G)/a]BGexp( 'X)} r {(ct-fG+l)/(a-fG)}
[cz/(ct4G)]B exp(—'X)
where the subscripted rtermis the incomplete gamma function with
argument (cx+G+l)/(a+C) and upper limit[a/(afG)]B(Xexp(?X). The
second integral is
N ='B aYU expj-'X— — (G/(ct+G)) BcL]exp(-'X)} dY
If we now let Z =?exp(—'X),then
N =exp{(B,X/a)+[G/()]BaeXP(?X)]}f zt+1)_1 exp(—Z) dZ
B exp(- 'X)
= 'X)}{r{ (a+1)/a} -r
B exp(—'X)
where the unsubscripted gamma term denotes a complete gammafunction.—33—
Finally, the expected value of the censored variable Yi
E(Y*) =M+ {1—F(B)}B
Substituting in the expressions derived above for M and F(B) produces
equation (4) in the text.—34—
Footnotes
1. See Feldstein (1974), for example.
2. Clines (1982).
3. See MoffittandNicholson (1982), for example.
4. See Unemployment Insurance Service (1977).
5. This sample restriction does not alleviate two other sources of error
in ascertaining which claimants were taxable. Oneisthat the CWBH
questionnaire data, like other survey data, are subject to con-
siderable income misreporting (see Strouse (1980)). Second, the CWBH
income variable refers to the claimant's family income during the 52
weeks before he filed his claim, whereas the releiant income measure
for tax purposes is family income during the calendar year. These
problems in income measurement undoubtedly caused errors in deter-
mining whether claimants were above or below the income thresholds for
benefit taxation. This misclassification of claimants with respect to
taxable status might tend to obscure true between—group differences in
unemployment duration and bias the estimated impact of benefit taxa-
tion toward zero.
6. The reason 34% of the taxable claimants did not qualify for the maxi-
mum WBA is that, although their family income was high, their own
earnings were low. Their high income was due mainly to the earnings
of other family members.
7. The author thanks Sherryl Edge and Joe Woodall for this information,
as well as for other advice about the Georgia progam and data.
8. This is documented for New York claimants in Entes (1980).
9. The approach used is similar to Rosen's (1976) and Williams' (1975)
method for estimating the impact of taxes on female labor supply.
10. Accurate imputation of each individual's tax rate is precluded by the
broad interval form in which the CWBH income data are reported. For
example, for a claimant whose income is above $25,000, the only other
information available is whether his income lies in the interval
$25,000—29,999 or in the interval $30,000 and above.
11. Other unemployment measures ——theaverage insured unemployment rate
for the year and the insured and total rates for the claimant's month
of filing and for the first three months of his benefit year ——also
were tried with virtually no effect on the results.—35—
12. Welch (1977) discusses this issue in detail. The Interaction of
high—quarter earnings with the 1979 dummy is included to allow for a
time effect that varies with wage level.
13. The estimated standard error was computed with the formula in Mood,
Graybill, and Boes (1974), p. 181, for approximating the variance of
the ratio of two random variables.
14. Several earlier studies of UI and unemployment duration excluded
individuals that filed valid claims but were unemployed too briefly to
collect benefits. As Classen (1979) and Welch (1977) point out, such
an exclusiontruncates the sample onthe basis of the dependent
variableandtherefore biases the estimated effects of benefit
variables. Unsurprisingly, rerunning the regression In column 1 of
Table 1 with such an exclusion preserves the qualitative results, but
reduces the estimated WBA coefficient from .045 to .036 and the
estimated DWBA coefficient from —.018 to —.011.
15. Inspection of empirical hazard rates for a homogenous subsample shows
thatthe assumption that the hazard rate changes nionotonically with y
Is consistent with the data.
16. See Johnson and Kotz (1970) for a detailed discussionof these and
otherproperties of the Weibull distribution.
17. This likelihood function is correct provided that the conditional
unemployment duration distribution (given the explanatory variablesX)
is independent of the censoring time. See Kalbfleisch and Prentice
(1980) for a detailed discussion of this issue. In their parlance,
thepresent case of censoring on the basis of the predetermined
explanatory variable P is censorship on the basis of a "fixed
covarlate."
18. The maximum likelihood estimationwas performed with the Davidon—
Fletcher—Powell and CRADX algorithms in the GQOPT numerical optimiza-
tion package. The algorithms are discussed in Quandt (forthcoming).
They converged to the same final paramater estimates when started from
different initial values.
19. See Bennett and Franklin (1954) for a discussion of the incomplete
gamma function.
20. An analagous simulation for the Weibull model estimates a 1.1 week
effect. The estimated effect on total unemployment duration In the
generalized model is 2.2 weeks, but confidence in this estimate
requires strong faith in the model's goodness of fit beyond the point
of censorship.
21. This computation uses 1/13 of high—quarter earnings in the base period
as an estimate of the weekly wage W.—36—
22. See the studies by Classen (1979), Ehrenberg and Oaxaca (1976), and
Holen (1977), and the critical review by Welch (1977).
23. See Bennett and Franklin (1954) for a discussion of the incomplete
gamma function.—37—
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